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A round midnight on March 29, 2014, some Chinese internet night owls noticed that the hazard factor of P-Xylene (PX) had been changed from “low” to “high” on Baidu Encyclopedia—the Chinese equivalent to  Wikipedia. The 
next morning, hundreds of protestors assembled in Maoming—a city in southern 
China’s industrial heartland—where a large-scale PX plant was planned. At 8:38 am, a 
message with pictures of the protest was posted on Sina Weibo—the Chinese equiva-
lent to Twitter. Tens of thousands of people joined the protests, demanding responses 
from local officials, burning a car, and throwing bottles until police dispersed the 
protesters with tear gas and batons. The next day, pictures of bloodied protestors 
circulated online. Thousands of posts debating the PX project and condemning the 
government’s action appeared on various social media platforms.
In the era of advanced information technology, social media can in some cases 
provide a huge information shock to a country like China, in which information 
and public communication has been limited by government control. How does 
such an information shock generated by social media affect the participation of 
Chinese citizens in political events? And how does the Chinese government respond 
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to this information shock? A first step in addressing these questions is to document 
the information published and communicated on China’s social media.
In this paper, we document basic facts regarding public debates about contro-
versial political issues on Chinese social media. Our documentation is based on a 
dataset of 13.2 billion blog posts published on Sina Weibo—the most prominent 
Chinese microblogging platform—during the 2009–2013 period. We also discuss 
the implications of our findings.
 Our primary finding is that a shockingly large number of posts on highly sensi-
tive topics were published and circulated on social media. For instance, we find 
millions of posts discussing protests such as the anti-PX event in 2014, and these 
posts are informative in predicting the occurrence of specific events. We find an 
even larger number of posts with explicit corruption allegations, and that these 
posts predict future corruption charges of specific individuals.
This type of social media content may increase the access of citizens to informa-
tion and constrain the ability of authoritarian governments to act without oversight. 
In China, social media clearly have the potential to play such a role because of their 
immense popularity. Nearly one-half of the population has access to the internet, 
and two of every ten Chinese actively use Weibo. Every day, millions of blog posts 
are produced, exchanged, and commented upon. Many of these posts reach thou-
sands or even millions of readers. It would be very costly for China’s government to 
monitor millions of users, especially when they are sometimes posted in large surges 
in the middle of the night. 
However, social media also provide authoritarian governments with new oppor-
tunities for political control as noted by Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009), Shirky 
(2011), Morozov (2012), and Lorentzen (2014). Social media messages are trans-
mitted in electronic form through an infrastructure that is typically controlled by 
the government. Recent advances in automated text analysis, machine learning 
techniques, and high-powered computing have substantially reduced the costs of 
identifying critical users and censoring messages (Edmond 2013). Governments can 
use these methods to track and analyze online activities, to gauge public opinion, 
and to contain threats before they spread. 
In an autocracy, how effective can a surveillance system based on social media 
be? We evaluate this possibility by exploring a very simple surveillance tool, and we 
find that social media can be very effective for protest surveillance. Most of the real-
world protests and strikes that we study can be predicted one day in advance based 
on social media content. The method of detection is simple, and the cost is low.
Indeed, Chinese government agencies across the country have invested heavily 
in surveillance systems that exploit information on social media. The result is illus-
trated by another anti-PX event, which played out differently, a year earlier. Some 
citizens in Chengdu posted messages on Sina Weibo calling for demonstrations 
against the launch of a local PX project on Saturday, May 4, 2013. This call was 
picked up by the Chengdu government, which immediately took measures including 
making Saturday and Sunday of that week into working days and requiring students 
to be in school on those days. Consequently, the demonstration in Chengdu was 
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limited to a few hundred participants, whereas a similar anti-PX protest in Kunming 
on the same day drew more than 10,000 participants. In this case, surveillance of 
social media content helped the government contain a protest.
Another important surveillance function of social media is to monitor local 
governments and officials. In China, many political and economic decisions are 
delegated to local governments. These decisions need to be monitored, but local 
news and internal reports are likely to be distorted because local politicians control 
the local press and administration. In contrast, national politicians regulate social 
media. In social media, relentless complaints about local officials are abundant. 
Posts exposing officials who wore Rolex watches, lived in mansions, or had inappro-
priate girlfriends have resulted in investigations and dismissals. Not surprisingly, we 
observe millions of posts with explicit corruption allegations in our data. 
We find that social media posts related to corruption topics are effective for 
corruption surveillance. These posts help identify when and where corruption is 
more prevalent. Furthermore, we can predict which specific politicians will later 
be charged with corruption, up to one year before the first legal action. This result 
indicates that social media information can be a useful instrument to identify 
corruption, which probably holds in other countries as well.
It is not without risk to post information about protests and negative informa-
tion about local leaders, and some users have been punished for doing so (Freedom 
House 2012; Reporters Without Borders 2013). However, as far as we know, there 
is no previous systematic research on the extent and effectiveness of this form of 
policing. We investigate the scale of these practices by tracking regular users who 
post on sensitive issues and seeing whether their accounts are subsequently closed. 
Government can also use social media as a propaganda channel. In the above 
anti-PX examples, governments conducted vigorous propaganda campaigns via their 
accounts on social media. In one case, government accounts continuously blogged that 
“PX is no more carcinogenic than coffee.” The extent of this type of government postings 
is difficult to know because they emanate from a plethora of accounts across regions and 
government levels. In 2012, Sina Weibo reported that approximately 50,000 accounts 
were operated by government offices or individual officials, but there are no external 
estimates of this kind of government presence on social media. 
We seek to identify government accounts from user names and text analysis of 
the posts in our data. Based on this approach, we estimate that there are 600,000 
government-affiliated accounts, which contribute 4 percent of all posts about polit-
ical and economic issues on Sina Weibo, using a measure that includes government 
organization, mass-organization, and media users. Even when limited to the most 
restrictive definition of government user, Sina Weibo’s reported number substan-
tially underestimates the government presence on Sina Weibo. 
Our findings challenge a popular view that an authoritarian regime would 
relentlessly censor or even ban social media. Instead, the interaction of an authori-
tarian government with social media seems more complex. From the government 
point of view, social media is not only (1) unattractive as a potential outlet for 
organized social protest but is also (2) useful as a method of monitoring local 
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officials and (3) gauging public sentiments, as well as (4) a method for dissemi-
nating propaganda. From the point of view of citizens, any perceived benefits of 
social media need to be evaluated in a context of (5) possible pervasive policing, 
punishment, and (6) censorship of such media. As mentioned above, this complex 
interaction has been discussed by researchers. However, rigorous empirical study 
on this subject is scant. An exception is Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova (2016), 
who find that social media affected protests in Russia in 2011. The other excep-
tion is censoring, which has been studied extensively (for example, Bamman, 
O’Connor, and Smith 2012; Fu, Chan, and Chau 2013; King, Pan, and Roberts 
2013, 2014; Zhu, Phipps, Pridgen, Crandall, and Wallach 2013). In contrast, we 
will not discuss censoring, but present evidence key to all the other five points 
listed above. 
We begin with an overview of the development of social media in China, 
followed by a description of the data. We proceed to analyze protests, corruption, 
and the government presence on Sina Weibo. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
social media, given our results.
Background on the Development and Regulation of Social Media  
in China
By 2013, there were 618 million Chinese internet users, accounting for approx-
imately 46 percent of the Chinese population. This rate is slightly higher than the 
global average of 39 percent (China Internet Network Information Center 2014; 
International Telecommunication Union 2013). Of China’s internet users, 281 
million (45 percent) actively participated in microblogging, which refers to social 
media outlets that focus on short messages, individual images, or perhaps video 
links (as opposed to social media like Facebook that have the potential for longer-
form or more detailed communication). 
The popularity of microblogs is a recent phenomenon. In 2006, Chinese people 
became aware of Twitter; the next year, major Chinese counterparts—Fanfou, Digu, 
and Jiwai—were launched. The number of microbloggers grew slowly at first. After 
the Urumqi riots in July 2009, the Chinese government not only blocked Twitter and 
Facebook but also shut down most domestic microblogging services. The microblog 
market in China was then essentially vacant until Sina Weibo appeared in August 
2009, and NetEase, Sohu, and Tencent followed in 2010. The number of microblog 
users surged from 63 million at the end of 2010 to 195 million by mid-2011 (China 
Internet Network Information Center 2011).
Sina Weibo is a hybrid of Twitter and Facebook: up to 140 Chinese characters per 
tweet, embedded pictures or videos are allowed, and users can send private messages, 
comment, and repost. With its easy access and use, Sina Weibo soon became the 
most popular microblogging platform in China. By 2010, it had 50 million registered 
users, and this number doubled in 2011, reaching a peak of over 500 million at the 
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end of 2012. Since 2013, Sina Weibo has lost some ground to WeChat, a cellphone-
based social networking service, but has remained an influential platform.1 
In recent years, microblogs have provided some of the most extensive and vivid 
discussions and debates in China. According to the Reports on Public Opinion 
2010–2013, for example, in 2012, the two most popular Facebook-type social media 
platforms in China—Renren and Kaixin—covered the top 20 public events listed by 
the Public Opinion Monitoring Agency (which is run by the government newspaper 
People’s Daily) in 20 million posts. However, Sina Weibo—the leading microblog site 
at the time—covered the same events in more than 230 million posts.
The Chinese central government has the power and tools to limit sensitive 
content on social media, if it wishes. The sensitive social media content that we find 
is unlikely to be the result of inability to clean up social media. Instead, the govern-
ment must perceive benefits from leaving this content visible. Two primary tools are 
used to limit content. 
The first tool is policing—to punish users who post sensitive content to induce 
self-censorship and to avoid content being posted. Policing is carried out by tens 
of thousands of information officers and internet monitors who are active at all 
levels of government (Chen and Ang 2011). Local politicians may use their own 
internet police to suppress negative information about the regions under their 
administration, even if blogging about this information is tolerated or encouraged 
by the central government. Users who post undesired content may receive warn-
ings, have their accounts shut down, and even be imprisoned. Reporters Without 
Borders (2013) documented a total of 69 netizens in Chinese jails as of February 
2013, although the number of unreported cases may be much bigger. There is no 
previous systematic research on the extent of policing, as far as we know. We will 
investigate the scale of these practices by tracking regular users who post on sensi-
tive issues to see whether their accounts are subsequently closed. 
Of course, personal punishments can occur only if a user is identified. The 
Chinese government initially allowed users on Sina Weibo to post anonymously. In 
March 2012, the media control authority required users to reveal their identities 
to social media providers. However, three years later, service providers had yet to 
implement this regulation in its entirety.
The other control tool is censoring. Censorship is regulated by the national 
Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as by a number 
of national media control offices. However, in practice, censorship is implemented 
largely by private service providers who are registered in Beijing. The estimated 
extent of censorship of Sina Weibo ranges from 0.01 percent of posts by a sample 
of prioritized users, including dissidents, writers, scholars, journalists, and VIP users 
(Fu, Chan, and Chau 2013) to 13 percent of posts on selected sensitive topics (King, 
Pan, and Roberts 2013). King, Pan, and Roberts find that the Chinese government 
1 Our data for this study ends in 2013. In that year, the number of Weibo users dropped by almost 28 
million and the utilization ratio dropped by 9.2 percentage points, according to the China Internet 
Network Information Center (2014).
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allows criticism of officials and bureaucrats but censors information about collective 
action more strictly (27 percent of posts censored). More generally, Bamman (2012) 
and Fu, Chan, and Chau (2013) find that internet censorship in China focuses on 
political and minority group issues. Zhu et al. (2013) find that the implementation 
of censorship is speedy: 30 percent of deletions occur within the first half hour and 
90 percent within 24 hours. Unlike these studies, our paper examines the content 
that is available on microblogs rather than what is removed.
The government can affect debates and sentiments on social media by actively 
posting their own content. Chinese governments at all levels have opened micro-
blog accounts in an effort to steer public opinion. In 2012, Sina Weibo reported that 
approximately 50,000 accounts were operated by government offices or individual 
officials. Governments at different levels also hire internet trolls, nicknamed “the 
50-cent party” because some are paid at a piece-rate of 50 cents per post. Some 
commentators, at the behest of local politicians, may post fake positive reviews 
about the politicians or the regions under their administration. 
Data on Sina Weibo Posts, 2009–2013
Our primary data, Sina Weibo posts, were collected by Weibook Corp. During 
the 2009–2013 period, this company executed a massive data collection strategy 
to download the posts of active users. First, the firm identified 200–300 million 
authentic active persons using Sina Weibo based on the individual’s information 
and interaction with other users. Second, they categorized users into six tiers based 
on the number of followers. They downloaded the microblogs of the top-tier users 
at least daily, the second and third tiers every 2–3 days, and the lowest tier down-
loaded on a weekly basis. Thus, the data include at least some posts that are later 
censored. For each post, they provided the content, posting time, and user informa-
tion (including self-reported location).
In total, the dataset that we study contains 13.2 billion posts published from 
2009 to 2013. According to our estimation, the Weibook data contains approxi-
mately 95 percent of the total posts published on Sina Weibo.2
From this Weibook database, we extract microblogs mentioning any of approxi-
mately 5,000 keywords that are related to social and political topics. The keywords 
fall into two groups. The first group refers to categories of issues, including polit-
ical positions from the central to the village levels, names of top political leaders, 
social and economic issues (such as corruption, pollution, food and drug problems, 
disasters and accidents, and crimes), and collective action events (such as strikes, 
protests, petitions, and mass conflicts). Some words occur at a very high frequency. 
2 Using the Sina Weibo public API, we downloaded all posts containing the neutral words “ya” or “hei” 
during four five-minute intervals each day and then divided by the average share of posts that contained 
these words and the average share of posts contained in these five-minute intervals in a day. We were not 
able to do this for later years because the public timeline API denied access.
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We collect a random sample that consists of only 10 percent of the posts mentioning 
these words. The second group of keywords refers to specific collective action events 
that we have recorded, including those events noted in censorship directives issued 
by the Chinese media control authorities and a large number of massive collective 
action events from 2009 to 2013. In total, our extracted data contain 202 million 
posts from 30.6 million different users.3 
Conflicts, Protests, and Strikes
We analyze 545 large collective action events that took place in mainland China 
between 2009 and 2012. The list of events was derived from coverage by Radio Free 
Asia, a nonprofit radio station based in Washington, DC. We classify these collective 
action events into four categories, ranked by sensitivity. The first category contains 
the most sensitive events, which involve direct confrontations between government 
and the public, including those involving riots and violence. The second category 
contains protests, including street demonstrations and mass protests, which are 
typically more expected and organized, less violent, and even often approved by 
the government. In several cases, protests evolved into riots, as in the Wansheng 
Event in Chongqing in 2012; we code such events as “conflicts.” The third category 
contains strikes, including strikes in factories and schools and among taxi drivers. 
The last category includes anti-Japan demonstrations. 
We select keywords that identify posts about each event type and extract all 
posts that mention these keywords from the entire Weibook dataset. The method 
for extracting keywords is described in the online Appendix.
Content and Users
We initially thought that coverage of these events on social media would be 
very limited. As just noted, it is well-documented that Chinese internet users have 
been punished after posting about protests and other collective action events (for 
example, Freedom House 2012) and that these types of posts are censored (King, 
Pan, and Roberts 2013). But to our surprise, we found a large number of posts 
covering even the most sensitive collective action events based on our classifica-
tion. In our data, we identify 382,000 posts in the “conflict” category and over 2.5 
million posts in the “protest” category. As this finding attracted some doubt when 
we presented the paper, we use various approaches to examine it further. 
As a starting point, we characterize the “hot topics” in posts about collective 
action. These topics are identified by words that are used more often in collective 
3 To analyze word frequencies in the Chinese text, we use the Stanford Word Segmenter to segment the 
words in each microblog post. We remove stopwords, punctuations, URLs, usernames, and non-Chinese 
characters (except meaningful English abbreviations) from the text. We exclude words with more than 
30 characters and words occurring fewer than five times. We obtain 3.2 million distinct words and 6.0 
billion “tokens” (or word occurrences).
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action posts than in the entire sample of posts. More precisely, we compare the 
frequency of each word in a given category with the overall frequency of this word 
in our dataset, as in Kleinberg (2006). Table 1 presents the hot-topic words in order 
of statistical significance. For example, in the conflict category, “suppression” has 
the most abnormally high use. Note that the topic ranking is not based on the 
absolute frequency of the words, but on the use of the word relative to its general 
usage. For example, “tear-gas bomb” is ranked above “government” because the 
latter word is more commonly used in general. Other topic words in this category 
include “police” “violence,” “revolt,” and “opening fire.” 
To characterize these data further, we investigate a random sample of 1,000 posts 
for each of the first three collective action categories in Table 1 and for anti-Japan 
demonstrations. We manually code whether and how the posts cover a particular 
type of event, with the results shown in Table 2. Out of our 1,000 post samples, the 
share of posts that actually cover the events ranges from 50.4 percent for the anti-
Japan category to 31.2 percent for the strike category. The more sensitive events like 
conflict and protests receive more coverage in the form of general and retrospective 
comments. Here are a few examples to convey a sense of our coding.
“I saw hundreds of policemen armed with weapons. Fire was everywhere after some gas 
containers were bombed.” [Conflict, ongoing]
“A big crowd is gathering in front of the government building, holding ‘No Forced 
Demolition of House’ signs.” [Protest, ongoing]
“The money from selling lands all went into the pockets of officials. They are nothing 
but gangsters. We have no choice but to rebel.” [Protest, general]
“Seriously? Taxi-drivers strike again!” [Strike, ongoing]
“Low wages, cheap labor. We make tons of Made-in-China, but receive little in return. 
Migrant workers, strike!” [Strike, general]
“We will march towards the Japanese Embassy today. Gathering at the People’s Square 
at 10 am. Anyone wanna join?” [Anti-Japan, forthcoming]
This Weibo content predicts real-world collective action events. Table 3 reports 
the average number of posts for each event type published by users in the prefecture 
where an event took place on the day of the event and on the day before. Suppose, 
for example, that a strike took place in a given prefecture and day. We then count 
the number of posts that contain any of our keywords related to strikes by users from 
this prefecture on the same day as the strike and on the day before the strike. We do 
this for all strikes and report the averages in the table. The average number of posts 
is much higher on the day of and the day before a collective action event than on 
other days. To make sure that the posts the day before really do predict these events, 
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Table 1 
Hot Topics by Category
A. Conflict (sensitivity: very high) B. Protest (sensitivity: high)
# of posts: 382,232 # of posts: 2,526,325
Frequency Word Translation Frequency Word Translation
322,797 镇压 suppression 647,711 示威 demonstration
32,117 冲突 conflict 534,784 静坐 sit-in
19,124 警民 police and people 430,112 自焚 self-immolation
17,460 催泪弹 tear-gas bomb 260,574 讨薪 ask for compensation
31,161 矛盾 contradictory 346,836 游行 parade
40,286 警察 police 164,367 请愿 petition
14,271 官民 officials and people 113,936 示威者 demonstrators
31,935 暴力 violence 109,339 堵路 stops up the road
130,036 被 by 166,600 抗议 protest
74,391 政府 government 101,845 集会 assembly
12,002 宽恕 forgiveness 118,262 农民工 migrant workers
12,764 武力 military force 103,975 思 thinking
18,951 军队 army 80,481 静静 static
29,566 民众 populace 60,237 闲谈 chat
14,701 叙利亚 Syria 58,318 人非 shortcomings of people
20,170 抗议 protest 72,753 民工 laborers
60,068 人民 people 63,719 白宫 White House
21,521 村民 villagers 130,198 坐 sitting
10,264 起义 revolt 60,957 己 oneself
10,150 开枪 gunfire 37,904 玩火自焚 being made to pay for
 one’s evil doings
C. Strike (sensitivity: medium) D. Corruption
# of posts: 1,348,964 # of posts: 5,326,897
Frequency Word Translation Frequency Word Translation
1,361,854 罢工 strike 1,455,878 贪污 embezzlement
69,068 罢课 student strike 1,658,687 腐败 corrupt
101,887 工人 workers 681,055 公款 government money
98,822 电脑 computer 674,503 受贿 take bribe
65,557 出租车 taxi 556,609 贿赂 give bribe
164,549 泪 tears 975,187 官员 officials
46,219 工会 trade union 393,125 廉政 honest government
91,051 抓狂 driven nuts 639,293 利益 benefit
55,687 司机 drivers 1,002,491 政府 government
48,845 集体 collective 245,606 挪用 diverting
52,066 员工 staff 512,006 集团 group
157,937 今天 today 201,891 吃喝 food and drink
24,477 的士 taxi 153,731 职权 authority
22,559 法国人 French 572,569 钱 money
51,479 上班 going to work 247,942 贪官 corrupt officials
16,290 罢市 merchant strike 156,363 滥用 abusiveness
40,827 抗议 protest 291,309 原 former
86,612 手机 cell phone 288,287 干部 cadres
17,679 罢 strike 123,827 行贿 bribery
41,586 工资 wages 126,820 情妇 mistress
Note: This table presents the hot-topic words, ordered by how abnormally high the frequency of the 
word is in the posts that cover a particular category (for example, “conflict”) compared to that in the 
entire dataset.
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and do not arise for spurious reasons such as miscoding of the posting dates, the 
final column of Table 3 examines coal mine accidents. These should clearly not be 
predicted by microblogging posts. We obtain data on the locations and days of 253 
coal mine accidents during the 2010–2012 period from the State Administration of 
Coal Mine Safety. We search for word strings related to coalmine accidents in our 
dataset. While coal mine accidents are covered much more on the day of the acci-
dent, they are not discussed more frequently on the day before the accident than on 
other days. This finding is related to Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun (2014) who find 
that the number of protesters in Tahrir Square on any given day was predicted by the 
number of tweets with Tahrir hashtags. Of course, media control in Egypt in 2011 was 
much less strict than in China. 
We also carry out a more detailed analysis that examines how well microblog 
discussion, compared to newspaper coverage, predicts when and where these 
collective action events would occur. We use news reports from 62 general-interest 
newspapers that covered at least one of these events during the 2010–2012 period. 
Table 2 
Collective Action Posts
  Out of a random 1,000 post sample:
Total posts 
containing  
keywords
Posts  
actually about 
defined topic
Forthcoming 
event
On-going 
event Past event
General 
comments
Conflict 382,232 398 1  11 156 230
Protest 2,526,325 317 2  19 172 124
Strike 1,348,964 312 5 178  39  90
Anti-Japan 2,506,944 504 9 188  42 265
Note: For each category of hot topic, out of the total instances of the words used, we investigate a random 
sample of 1,000 posts. We manually coded whether and how the posts cover a particular type of event.
Table 3 
Event Prediction and Detection  
(# per prefecture and day)
Variables Conflict Protest Strike Anti-Japan
Coal mine 
Accident
# Weibo posts day of event 6.1 62.6 167.3 2,036.6 3.0
# Weibo posts day before event 3.4 54.3  48.1 924.6 0.7
# Weibo posts on day with no event 0.7  4.4  2.5 4.5 1.2
Note: For each event type, this table reports the average number of posts published by users in the 
prefecture where an event took place on the day of the event (first row) and on the day before it (second 
row). The third row shows the analogous average number of posts on days when no such event took place.
Bei Qin, David Strömberg, and Yanhui Wu     127
While microblogs are highly significant in predicting where and when collective 
action events took place, newspaper coverage of this event type is uninformative.4 
In sum, we find literally millions of posts on Sina Weibo that discuss sensitive 
collective action events. Many of these posts were posted before or concurrent with 
the events and predict the events. The fact that people began discussing events 
before they happen indicates that Sina Weibo may be used to organize or at least to 
coordinate collective action events. 
To investigate whether the users who post this type of sensitive content are 
identified and perhaps punished, we examine the subsequent posts of the users who 
blogged about collective action events. Sixteen percent of these posts are the last 
post published by a user in the data that contain any of the 5,000 keywords. In the 
“conflict” and “protest” categories, the corresponding rates are 17 and 23 percent, 
respectively. The share of users who exit from our data within five or ten more posts 
is slightly higher in the full data (38 and 49 percent) than in the conflict and protest 
categories (33–34 and 41–42 percent). In short, we find that users who posted on 
these topics continued to post to a similar extent as other users, indicating that their 
accounts were not more likely to be closed nor were their posts muted. 
Another way to investigate whether users are concerned about censorship is to 
see whether posts on sensitive topics tend to come from user accounts with relatively 
few posts—which could be a sign that users create separate Sina Weibo accounts 
for controversial messages, perhaps even with hidden IP addresses. However, the 
average number of posts from users who blog on sensitive topics is not significantly 
lower than that of a randomly drawn comparison sample of users (drawn using 
the number of posts by each user as sampling weights). The bottom line is that, 
although there are documented cases of people being punished after posting sensi-
tive content, this does not seem to happen on a large scale. Broadly speaking, people 
do not seem afraid to post on these topics.
Surveillance
We examine how effective social media information is for government surveil-
lance of collective action events. As noted earlier, government agencies across China 
have invested heavily in software to track and analyze online activities, to gauge 
public opinion, and to contain threats before they spread (as reported in Epstein 
2013). Presumably, these government agencies desire an early warning system for 
collective action events. We imagine that such a system might work in two steps. The 
first step is automated: just have software be alert for days when mentions of certain 
events spike on social media. Second, hire actual human beings to read the posts 
published on those days.
4 Details of this regression analysis are reported in Table 3 in the working paper version of this paper 
(Qin, Strömberg, and Wu 2017). We regress an indicator for an event occurring on the number of Weibo 
posts from users in a prefecture that mention the event keywords on the event day, in one set of regres-
sions, or on the previous day, in another set of regressions.
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We explore this automation-plus-manpower method. We study 316 prefectures 
for all days from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012. We study anti-Japan events 
and strikes because these events are less likely to be censored and hence we have 
similar Weibo post information as the government. For the first step, we have the 
software alert us all days when a user from a city writes a post mentioning any of 
our event keywords. One day in advance, this alarm would identify 42 of the 43 anti-
Japan events and 115 of the 130 strikes. This would require investigating 109,726 and 
104,241 prefecture-days, respectively (out of 346,020). It is very easy to improve this 
crude method, both to find more events and at the same time reduce the number of 
observations searched.
For the second step, we manually read the strike-related social media posts in 
the 100 prefecture-days with the most strike-related posts, which took us about two 
hours in total. (Remember, these are very short messages!) Thus, our estimated 
time-cost of analyzing the 104,000 prefecture-days necessary to discern 115 strikes 
one day in advance is 2,080 person-hours. This would be the aggregate time cost for 
all prefectures spread over three years. From that perspective, the cost is very small. 
The bottom line is that collective action events that are large enough to pose poten-
tial threats to the regime are likely to be easily detected using social media data, and 
they can be detected one day in advance.
Several other interesting points emerge from the above analysis. One is that, 
when manually reading all of the strike-related social media posts for the top 100 
days, we detected 23 strikes during these prefecture-days that were also in our original 
dataset. However we also identified 14 additional strikes. Our procedure thus shows 
how social media can be used as a data-collection device in countries where data on 
relevant social outcomes are scarce but data from social media are abundant. 
Monitoring Local Politicians
Can social media provide information relevant to holding local politicians 
accountable to higher-level politicians? We will first describe the content on Sina 
Weibo related to corruption. We then analyze 200 corruption cases involving high-
ranking Chinese government or Communist Party of China leaders, drawing on 
examples of corruption from the Central Disciplinary Committee of the Commu-
nist Party and the Ministry of Supervision, as well as news reports published by the 
Chinese government’s mouthpiece news agency, Xinhua News. We find that Weibo 
posts predict a number of corruption cases one year in advance.
To examine coverage of corruption on social media, we combine two types 
of microblog posts: those mentioning politicians or political positions and those 
mentioning corrupt behavior. For the first category, we retrieve posts that mention 
any major political position at the central, provincial, prefectural, county, or village 
levels. We obtain over 11 million total posts in this category. Column 1 of Table 4 
shows the number of posts covering each position or top leader. The table is sorted 
by number of posts per position, shown in Column 2—(for example, there are 31 
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offices for provincial-level positions). Xi Jinping, the current president of China and 
the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, is the most discussed leader, 
with over 1.3 million posts mentioning his name, followed by Wen Jiabao, the former 
prime minister of China. In general, officials at higher levels are more extensively 
discussed, and executive positions are covered more than are party secretaries.
Regarding the second category of posts mentioning corrupt behavior, we 
search for words that are widely used to describe corrupt behavior, wrongdoing, and 
punishment of officials. The hot topic words in this category are “embezzlement,” 
“corrupt,” “government money,” and “give bribes/take bribes” (as shown earlier in 
Table 1, Column 4). We identify over 5.3 million posts in this category.
To characterize posts about corruption, we manually inspect 1,000 randomly 
selected posts that use these terms. Most of these posts make general comments on 
corruption. Of the 419 posts that discuss specific corruption cases, 293 were written 
after the government had taken action. However, 126 posts discuss instances of corrup-
tion before government action. These 126 posts can be divided into two main types. 
One type targets specific government officials, illustrated by the following two examples.
“XXX, the Party secretary of XXX village, misused the money transferred from the 
central government for low-income villagers to pay his family members and relatives.”
“XXX, the chief officer of XXX county, embezzled public money by awarding all major 
government project contracts to his brother’s company. Even worse, he hired gangsters to 
stab people who reported his corruption to the upper-level government.”
Table 4 
Coverage of Politicians
Position # Posts # Posts per position
% Posts discussing 
specific corruption 
cases
Measure of 
sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Xi Jinping 1,374,780 1,374,780 0.23 0.88
Wen Jiabao 1,318,345 1,318,345 0.15 0.51
Li Keqiang 401,451 401,451 0.14 0.81
Hu Jintao 326,621 326,621 0.10 1.16
Provincial governor 728,386 23,496 1.88 -0.19
Provincial Party secretary 403,074 13,002 1.91 0.52
City mayor 3,431,471 10,305 1.39 0.17
City party secretary 718,856 2,159 2.81 0.28
County governor 719,634 251 1.21 -0.70
County Party secretary 324,522 113 4.40 -0.88
Village chief 1,053,346 25 0.65 -0.51
Village Party secretary 144,742 3 4.26 -1.40
Note: Column 1 shows the number of posts covering each position or top leader. The table is sorted 
by column 2—the number of posts per office. Column 3 shows the estimated percentage of posts 
mentioning a leader’s position that discuss specific corruption cases. Column 4 presents a broader 
measure of people’s sentiments towards the leader or type of leader. See text for details.
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The other type of post conveys resentment of and anger toward certain corrupt 
officials. In most cases, these posts talk about positions and government divisions 
without specifying the names of the officials. Several examples are documented as 
follows.
“The black market for government positions in XXX prefecture is rampant. The price 
is getting higher and higher, the top officials in this prefecture are becoming richer and 
richer, and corruption will be more and more severe because the buyers need to make 
sufficient money to cover their costs.”
“Without support from the prefecture party secretary and the vice governor, how dare 
these prefecture officials sell government positions? Crack down on the tigers!”
“Billions of money went into the pockets of local officials and their business partners! 
President Xi, Premier Li, and Secretary Wang in the Central Discipline Inspection 
Department, do you read our microblogs? Can you hear our voice? Please eradicate these 
corrupt officials! Right now!”
Column 3 of Table 4 shows the estimated percentage of posts mentioning a 
leader’s position that discuss specific corruption cases. Specifically, we predict the 
probability that a post about a position discusses specific cases of corruption based 
on the frequencies of words used. For example, the last row shows that over 4 percent 
of all posts that mention village or county party secretaries also mention specific 
corruption cases. To obtain a broader measure of people’s sentiments towards their 
leaders, we subtract the number of negative words from the number of positive 
words in all posts mentioning these leaders (using the National Taiwan University 
Sentiment Dictionary).
Column 4 of Table 4 shows that county and village party secretaries are the subject 
of the most negative sentiment and are associated with the largest share of corruption 
posts. One interpretation of this finding is that these two types of officials are usually 
viewed as the most powerful low-ranked politicians who have opportunities to be 
corrupt. An alternative view is that they are the most vulnerable officials in anti-corrup-
tion campaigns because they are at the bottom of the Chinese government hierarchy.
Estimating from our random sample of 1,000 posts, our dataset contains 
approximately 668,000 posts that discuss specific instances of corruption before 
government action. This provides a wealth of information for upper-level govern-
ments seeking to hold lower-level politicians accountable. Clearly, posts of this type 
are not censored by the central government. 
We find some posts that do explicitly criticize top national leaders, although 
these posts do not contain explicit corruption allegations. Such posts claim, for 
example, that democracy and social stability decreased under Hu Jintao’s reign, 
that the campaign against Bo Xilai was initiated by Xi Jinping as part of a political 
fight, and that Wen Jiabao shifted capital to Wenzhou to help the children of some 
top leaders.
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We find no evidence that users who post this type of sensitive content are 
systematically identified and punished. Users who post about corruption continue 
to post to the same extent as other users. It also seems that people are not afraid of 
posting concrete corruption allegations implicating powerful local politicians, as 
these posts are not generated from special accounts with few posts. One possible 
reason is that, even if local governments can identify bold users, it is risky for them 
to take action against these users because this may trigger an even bigger response 
in social media, which may further jeopardize the implicated politicians’ career.
To investigate whether social media posts predict future corruption charges, 
we study a sample of 200 corruption charges: 15 at the national level, 39 at 
the provincial level, 114 at the prefecture level, and 32 at the county level. For 
comparison, we construct a matched control sample of 480 politicians who were 
not charged with corruption. The control politicians hold similar political posi-
tions to and are located in areas geographically near to the charged politicians.
We count the number of posts mentioning the name of each of these 680 poli-
ticians and the number of posts that mention both the politician and any word in 
our corruption category. We calculate the number of posts 2–7 months (as well as 
12–23 months) before a corruption charge. Table 5 shows that corrupt and noncor-
rupt officials are mentioned in roughly the same number of posts 2–7 months 
before a corruption charge: 49 and 44.4 posts, respectively. However, corrupt offi-
cials appear much more frequently in posts that mention our corruption words (3.9 
compared to .4). A similar pattern is found in posts published 12–23 months before 
a charge. Given the substantial difference in the number of corruption posts, it is 
not surprising that in more formal regression analysis, these posts are highly predic-
tive of corruption charges.5
5 In the working paper version of this paper (Qin, Strömberg, and Wu 2017), Table 5b presents the 
results of a regression of the corruption-charge indicator on the number of posts mentioning an official’s 
name and corruption. The regression also includes the number of posts mentioning only the official’s 
name, but this variable is never significant. Columns 2, 4, and 5 include dummy variables for case indica-
tors, which are assigned the same value for an official charged with corruption and his or her matched 
Table 5 
Mean Number of Posts, by Corruption Charge 
2–7 month lag 12–23 month lag
Name Corruption Name Corruption
Corrupt official 49.0 3.9 148.3 4.7
Noncorrupt official 44.4 0.4 121.1 1.8
Note: To investigate whether social media posts predict future corruption charges, we study a sample of 
200 corruption charges. For comparison, we construct a matched control sample of 480 politicians who 
were not charged with corruption. We count the number of posts mentioning the name of each of these 
680 politicians and the number of posts that mention both the politician and any word in our corruption 
category. We calculate the number of posts 2–7 months (as well as 12–23 months) before a corruption 
charge.
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However, a significant number of corrupt officials fly under the social media 
radar. In particular, 133 officials later found to be corrupt were never mentioned in 
a corruption post two months or more before the first government action against 
them. From the perspective of the Chinese central government, which aims to crack 
down on corruption, a simple rule would be to investigate all officials with at least 
one corruption post. In our sample, this rule would lead to the investigation of 192 
officials, 67 of whom were later charged with corruption. 
Social media posts predict which top politicians will be charged with corrup-
tion one year before the first legal action. The reason may be that these individuals 
are indeed more corrupt. Another reason may be that the central government 
lifts censorship of corruption posts, or even plants its own corruption posts, about 
leaders who have lost political support and who will later be charged with corrup-
tion. To investigate the planting of stories, we examined a well-reported scandal 
involving Bo Xilai, a high-ranking official. We find that there was blanket censoring 
of posts mentioning Bo Xilai between the start of investigation on March 15, 2012, 
and the ultimate action undertaken by the Communist Party on September 28, 
2012. We find no evidence that censorship focused on posts that were supportive of 
Bo Xilai or that there was a trend in corruption stories prior to his downfall.
In summary, a massive volume of Sina Weibo posts discuss corruption. These posts 
help identify the political positions, regions, time, and individuals involved in instances 
of corruption. The lack of censorship shows that for the central Chinese govern-
ment, improved monitoring of lower-level officials outweighs the negative publicity of 
corruption coverage. The results also suggest that local politicians are at least not fully 
effective in imposing self-censorship on users or otherwise distorting the information.
Propaganda
Propaganda posted on social media is largely generated by government- 
affiliated users: government departments; mass organizations, such as schools and 
hospitals and industrial associations that are part of the public sector; and state-
owned media (note that, per regulation, all general-interest media that are allowed 
to publish political content are owned and supervised by the government). We will 
study these types of high-powered users. We do not study internet trolls hired by the 
government to distract the public debate (King, Pan, and Roberts 2016). We use two 
approaches to identify government posts. On a small scale, we manually code posts 
published by randomly selected users; on a large scale, we use machine learning 
techniques to discern the language patterns used by well-known government users 
and thus predict which accounts are affiliated with the Chinese government. We 
then investigate the goals of these government-affiliated users. 
officials. Corruption charges are strongly predicted by the number of posts mentioning corruption 2–7 
and 12–23 months before the first legal action.
Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media?      133
Volume
In 2012, Sina Weibo reported that approximately 50,000 accounts were oper-
ated by government offices or individual officials. Our estimation shows that even 
when limited to the most restrictive definition of government user (excluding 
mass-organization and media accounts), this reported number substantially under-
estimates the government presence on Sina Weibo.
We manually code a sample of 1,000 Sina Weibo users randomly selected from 
our entire database of 30 million users. A user is classified as a government user if 
the posts explicitly reveal the user’s identity or are mostly related to the activities of 
a government function; mass-organization users are analogously coded. An account 
is classified as a media account if the posts reveal that the user is a media outlet 
or a division. Table 6 shows the result. In our random sample of 1,000 users, 0.5 
percent are government users, implying that there are approximately 150,000 (with 
a standard deviation of 67,000) government users in the entire dataset. State-owned 
media and mass-organization users contribute an even larger share. In total, these 
three types of government-affiliated users comprise 2 percent—or 600,000—users. 
Thus, we estimate that the government-affiliated accounts contribute 3.6 percent 
of all posts in our database (with bootstrapped standard errors of 1.6 percent); see 
the right panel in Table 6. This percentage is greater than the 2 percent of govern-
ment-affiliated users because these users publish more posts than others do. Note 
that these estimates are restricted to the sample of posts that mention words related 
to political and economic issues. Because we do not include users who write on 
other topics, the total number of government-affiliated accounts on Sina Weibo is 
likely to be higher than our estimates. However, the share of government posts may 
be substantially lower on topics outside politics and economics.
Identifying Government Affiliation by Language
We also use a linguistics-based approach to predict the probability that a user 
is affiliated with the government. We restrict our attention to the 5.6 million users 
Table 6 
Government Presence on Sina Weibo
Users Posts
Type Percent Estimated #  
Standard 
deviation Percent
Standard 
deviation
Government .5 149,746 66,801 .2 .1
Media .5 149,746 66,801 2.3 1.6
Mass organization 1.0 299,491 94,233 1.1 0.5
Government-affiliated 2.0 598,982 132,590 3.6 1.6
Others 98.0 29,350,118 132,590
Note: Based on 1,000 Sina Weibo users randomly selected from our entire database of 30 million users. A 
user is classified as a government user if the posts explicitly reveal the user’s identity or are mostly related 
to the activities of a government function; mass-organization users are analogously coded. An account is 
classified as a media account if the posts reveal that the user is a media outlet or a division. “Government-
affiliated” is the sum of “government,” “media,” and “mass organization.”
134     Journal of Economic Perspectives
who publish more than five posts in our dataset. These users contribute more than 
three-quarters of all posts. First we identify 1,042 official, government-affiliated, and 
538 newspaper accounts by manually inspecting the blogs of thousands of users with 
user names typically associated with these functions. These accounts comprise only 
a small subset of all government accounts, but we can use them to determine what 
words are characteristic of government accounts and then use this information to 
estimate the total number of government accounts. Second, we adopt a widely used 
classification algorithm (Support Vector Machine (SVM)) to identify this type of user 
from a one-percent sample (28,440) of randomly drawn users based on the frequen-
cies of certain words in their posts.6 Based on performance in other classification 
tasks, SVMs have been identified as one of the most efficient classification methods 
(Dumais, Platt, Heckerman, and Sahami 1998; Joachims 1998; Sebastiani 2002). 
In the SVM classification, a large number of words are important. However, just to 
give a sense of the classification, the words with the highest weight are “Communist 
Youth League,” “Municipal Party Committee,” and “Convention.” Third, we use the 
estimated result from this test sample to predict the probability that each of the 5.6 
million users is government-affiliated. We compute the average of this probability in 
total, by province, and by prefecture. This average probability provides a measure of 
the share of government-affiliated users across geographic regions.
At the national level, we estimate that 3.1 percent of the 5.6 million users are 
government affiliated (with a standard error of .8 percent). This is higher than the 2 
percent in the overall sample, but the two estimates are nonetheless roughly consis-
tent, because government users contribute more posts and are thus more strongly 
represented in the sample of users with more than five posts. The estimated share 
of posts published by government-affiliated users in this sample is 3.9 percent (with 
a standard deviation of 1.0 percent).
Goals of Government Users
Government users of social media may provide neutral information or propa-
ganda. Several patterns can help us to distinguish between the two possibilities. For 
example, in areas where the government perceives that the need for influence is high, 
we should observe more of both censorship and propaganda and a strong positive 
correlation between them. We should also observe a positive correlation between 
posts from government users and pro-government bias in traditional media, which 
are subject to greater government control than social media. Conversely, these corre-
lations should be absent if government users mainly provide neutral information. 
Earlier research suggests some other theses about propaganda, as well. Propa-
ganda may be more effective on audiences that share the message sender’s view, 
6 The word frequencies in each post are computed after the preprocessing described at the earlier 
section in Footnote 4. As inputs to the Support Vector Machine, we use term-frequency inverse docu-
ment frequencies. We use the software SVM-light (Joachims 1999). Using a new random sample of 500 
users, we estimate a probit model of the probability of being a government account conditional on the 
SVM parameter. See the online Appendix for details.
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while the effect of propaganda may be negative when the audience holds opposing 
views. For example, Adena, Enikolopov, Santarosa, and Zhuravskaya (2015) find 
that Nazi radio in the 1930s was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was 
historically high and had a negative effect on support for Nazi policies in places 
with historically low levels of anti-Semitism. Similarly, in a laboratory experiment, 
DellaVigna, Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zuravskaya (2014) find that Serbian 
radio exposure caused anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats. If the Chinese regime 
believes in this argument, then we would expect to find more government-affiliated 
accounts in Communist Party strongholds.
Finally, propaganda is likely to reduce consumers’ valuation of social media. To 
the extent that service providers can affect the amount of propaganda, we should 
see fewer official accounts in areas where the advertisement market is valuable and 
where competition for consumers is high. Although we lack direct measures of these 
factors, they are likely to be positively related to local incomes or GDP per capita.
We test these hypotheses using our own measure of government users on Sina 
Weibo across provinces of China against a measure of censorship and against a 
measure of bias in Chinese newspapers. The left panel of Figure 1 plots the esti-
mated share of government users against the measure of media bias in the daily 
newspapers strictly controlled by the Communist Party (from Qin, Strömberg, and 
Wu 2016). The latter measure is based on nine content categories, including leader 
mentions, citations of the official Communist Party news agency, and coverage of 
stories that criticize the regime. The right panel of Figure 1 plots the estimated 
share of government users against a measure of censorship developed by Bamman, 
Figure 1 
The Share of Government Users on Sina Weibo across Provinces versus 
Newspaper Bias and Censorship
Note: Each dot represents one province in China. The left panel plots estimated share of government 
users against the measure of media bias in the daily newspapers strictly controlled by the Communist 
Party (from Qin et al. 2016). The right panel plots estimated share of government users against the 
measure of censorship developed by Bamman et al. (2012), the share of deleted posts.
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O’Connor, and Smith (2012): the share of deleted posts. Guangdong has the lowest 
share of government users (2.5 percent), whereas Ningxia and Gansu have the 
highest share (6 percent). The graph looks virtually the same if we use the share 
of posts published by government users instead of the share of government users.
The two panels show that the estimated share of government users is strongly 
correlated with both the share of deleted posts and newspaper bias (the correla-
tion coefficient is 0.7 in both cases). This positive correlation is consistent with the 
hypothesis that censorship, newspaper bias, and official accounts on Sina Weibo 
are used for the same propaganda purpose. Note that in Figure 1, Tibet has fewer 
government users than expected. Perhaps this is an indication that propaganda is 
not viewed as particularly effective in Tibet because of weaker underlying support 
for the Chinese central government.
Other correlations are also consistent with the belief that government users of 
social media are engaging in propaganda. Table 7 offers an illustrative cross-section 
regression. The dependent variable is the share of government users of Sina Weibo 
across prefectures of China. We use GDP as a measure of economic development. 
We include a variable, “CPC stronghold,” indicating areas where the Communist 
Party is comparatively more appreciated due to historical reasons (Qin, Strömberg, 
and Wu 2016). Conversely, some areas have a history of Western influence, notably, 
the areas that were part of a treaty port controlled by Western powers during the 
Table 7 
Patterns in the Share of Government Users Across Prefectures 
(Dependent Variable: Share of Government Users)
 I 
GDP - 0.849***
(0.103)
CPC stronghold 0.533**
(0.236)
Treaty port - 0.079
(0.166)
Distance to Beijing - 0.464***
(0.165)
Population 0.366***
(0.129)
Latitude 0.052***
(0.016)
Longitude - 0.037***
(0.014)
Observations 259
R2 0.358
Note: The unit of observation is the prefecture. The result is obtained by cross-
sectional ordinary least-squares regression. GDP and Population values are 
from 2010, which is the first year Sina Weibo was in use. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. “CPC” is “Communist Party of China.” “Treaty port” is a 
proxy for Western influence.
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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1840–1910 period (Jia 2014). Other variables in the regression include the distance 
to Beijing, latitude, longitude, and population. 
Our estimated share of government users across prefectures is significantly 
lower in areas with high levels of GDP and is higher in Communist Party of China 
strongholds. The latter result is consistent with the view that propaganda is more 
effective in areas where the audience shares the ideology of the sender. The esti-
mated share of government users also appears higher in areas that are closer to 
Beijing and in areas that are more populous. To sum up, these patterns are consis-
tent with propaganda being the main goal of this government social media content.
Conclusions and Discussion
We use a large dataset of blog posts from the most prominent Chinese microb-
logging platform—Sina Weibo—over the 2009–2013 period to document a number 
of basic facts. We now discuss how to make sense of these facts and what they may 
imply for outcomes that we are ultimately interested in, such as corruption, regime 
stability, local and central accountability, and the central–local balance of power.
Given the immense efforts to police and censor social media, it may seem 
puzzling that we find so much sensitive material available on social media. What are 
the private returns to posting this material? Why does the regime not punish users 
on a large scale, and why does the regime not censor all the sensitive material? We 
suggest the following explanation. 
The central government limits its censoring because only a small fraction of 
potentially sensitive material is likely to pose a meaningful threat to the regime. 
Although diverse and even dissenting public opinion may displease the regime, a 
complete cleanup of sensitive content can impair the regime’s ability to learn from 
bottom-up information and to address social problems before they become threat-
ening. Therefore, there exists a subtle trade-off in information control faced by an 
authoritarian regime. 
Social media users have an incentive to speak out about local problems as they 
expect the central government to address these problems. In the corruption posts, 
we find frequent explicit appeals for central government action. The posts about 
protests and strikes may help organize the events, but, importantly, they also make 
these events visible to the central government. This may force local leaders to deal 
with the problems that cause the protests and strikes. This line of reasoning may 
also explain why protests and strikes are rising in China7 even though we find it is 
simple and cheap to use social media to identify these events one day in advance. 
Local officials may not want to suppress them through police and violence because 
this will trigger an even larger response on social media. 
7 See, for example, Mark Magnier, “China’s Workers Are Fighting Back as Economic Dream Fades,” 
Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2015 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-workers-are-fighting- 
back-as-economic-dream-fades-1450145329).
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The visibility-enhancement effect of social media may also explain why we find 
no evidence of large-scale punishment of dissent users. One might think that this 
finding just reflects the consistency between censorship and policing—the posts 
that we observe were not sensitive enough to be censored, and people are thus 
not punished for posting them. However, the censors and the internet police are 
not the same people. The central government implements censorship while local 
governments can rely only on policing. So the question is why local politicians 
do not punish users whose posts may jeopardize their career, for instance, those 
who accuse them of corruption. One reason is that local politicians are not able to 
identify these users. Another reason is that social media can make local politicians’ 
punishment of dissenting users visible to the national leaders, which exposes local 
politicians to great political risks.
Given that the central government uses information from social media to 
monitor local officials, it is not surprising that local officials actively run their 
microblogs on Sina Weibo. Local politicians can signal their loyalty to the central 
government by engineering propaganda that promotes the party line while also 
deflecting corruption charges and demonstrating their ability to identify and solve 
local problems. However, it is costly to produce high-quality propaganda to domi-
nate a discussion among millions of users. We estimate that government-affiliated 
accounts contribute around 4 percent of all posts about politics and economics on 
Sina Weibo. While this is substantially larger than Sina’s official numbers, it is not 
overwhelming. In this light, it is not surprising that we find that the local leaders 
are unable to effectively dilute negative information about, for example, corruption 
and collective action.
What are the implications for the outcomes that we ultimately care about? 
Our findings suggest that social media in China primarily affects those outcomes in 
which the central regime and general users share a common interest. For example, 
the regime and social media users both benefit from fighting local corruption and 
other abuse of power by local leaders. In this aspect, Chinese social media seem to 
play a positive role in public affairs at the local level, improving the public’s access 
to information, engagement in public debate, and their ability to coordinate mass 
actions and respond to local problems. 
Conversely, outcomes in which the central regime and users have opposing 
interests are less likely to be affected. For instance, a very limited number of posts 
discuss top Chinese national leaders in a negative manner. Similarly, social media 
coverage of large-scale conflicts is muted, either by censorship or by self-censorship. 
Consequently, one might expect social media to increase the incidence of small and 
medium-sized protests, while decreasing the probability of large regime-threatening 
protests. Thus, it is far from clear that social media is capable of restraining the 
Chinese central government.
Our findings finally suggest that social media in China is likely to increase 
the power of the central government at the expense of local governments, which 
will be more closely monitored and have less discretion. Eventually, it may also 
lead to increased centralization of power as the central government’s incentive 
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to decentralize decisions is diminished by its improved ability to acquire local 
information. 
Given the advancing information technology and the changing Chinese polit-
ical landscape, it is natural to ask the question of how relevant the results of this 
paper are outside our sample period that ends in 2013. Since 2012, Sina Weibo 
has lost ground to other services, most notably WeChat and Qzone. Overall, user 
behavior and government censoring on these services are similar to that on Sina 
Weibo, but some differences should be noted. According to Ng (2015), a smaller 
share of posts are censored on WeChat than on Weibo. WeChat provides a some-
what less-effective tool to organize large-scale collective action or to expose corrupt 
officials, since only subscribers to an account can see a post. Thus, it is not surprising 
that, while WeChat is the most popular platform for instant messaging, Sina Weibo 
and Qzone are the most popular platforms for public information sharing. A survey-
based report issued by CNNIC shows that in 2015, the number of social media users 
who listed Sina Weibo as their first choice to follow current news events and social 
issues was twice as many as those who listed Qzone.8
Since 2012, Chinese governments have escalated their efforts to control social 
media. As part of this endeavor, since March 2012, users have been required to 
reveal their true identities to social media providers. Because our sample period 
spans until the end of 2013, we can provide a glimpse of the effect of tightening 
control and increased competition from WeChat. Our data show a fall in the 
number of total Weibo posts from 2012 to 2013 by around 30 percent. However, the 
number of posts about sensitive topics (conflict, protests, strikes, and corruption) 
changed only marginally. This result indicates that the traffic that moved to WeChat 
and other services was concentrated on nonpublic topics such as personal life and 
private chatting. It also suggests that the stricter regime has still found it not in its 
interest to fully censor posts about the sensitive topics that we study.
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